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Reasons to Accept Vaccine Refusers in
Primary Care
Mark C. Navin, PhD,a,b Jason A. Wasserman, PhD,b,c Douglas J. Opel, MD, MPHd,e
Vaccine refusal forces us to confront tensions between many values,
including scientific expertise, parental rights, children’s best interests,
social responsibility, public trust, and community health. Recent
outbreaks of vaccine-preventable and emerging infectious diseases
have amplified these issues. The prospect of a coronavirus disease
2019 vaccine signals even more friction on the horizon. In this
contentious sociopolitical landscape, it is therefore more important
than ever for clinicians to identify ethically justified responses to
vaccine refusal.
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) says dismissing families who
continue to refuse vaccines is an “acceptable option,”1 but some practices
have gone further by not accepting vaccine refusers as patients at all.2,3
The phenomenon of nonacceptance has been underexplored; in both
empirical studies and ethics analyses, researchers largely focus on
dismissal.4–7 In this article, we first criticize arguments for nonacceptance
that invoke a supposed right to choose one’s patients. We then argue that
nonacceptance is problematic because (1) some of its motivations are
intrinsically immoral, (2) it does not appear to accomplish some of its
goals, and (3) even when nonacceptance does accomplish its goals, it fails
to appropriately balance the various values it implicates. Throughout the
article, we engage with the existing ethics literature about dismissal and
conclude that even if dismissal is sometimes justifiable, nonacceptance
is not.
A RIGHT TO CHOOSE ONE’S PATIENTS?
Some may argue that nonacceptance is ethically justified because
they believe the clinical relationship is fundamentally a free
association between clinicians and patients, as the American Medical
Association Code of Medical Ethics appears to assert.8 If clinicians
have a right to choose their patients, then they may seem to have
moral permission to decline to accept vaccine-refusing families. On
this view, nonacceptance is ethical because, except in emergencies,
clinicians have no moral responsibility to treat people who are not their
patients.
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However, the freedom to choose one’s
patients does not mean all such
exercises of this choice are ethical.
Instead, clinicians have an ethical
obligation to use their professional
autonomy for good reasons and to
achieve good results. This distinction
is consistent with how the American
Medical Association Code of Medical
Ethics (x1.1.2) further delimits
permissible reasons for the rejection
of potential patients: if patients
demand medically inappropriate care,
if a clinician could not provide
patients competent care, or if
accepting new patients would
compromise care to existing
patients.8 Although one may argue
that vaccine refusers demand
medically inappropriate care, that is
incorrect; they instead reject one kind
of appropriate care. Vaccine refusers
are therefore similar to others who
reject some recommended
treatments, such as parents who
refuse the newborn screen.
Additionally, there is nothing about
accepting vaccine-refusing families
into one’s practice that prevents
clinicians from providing competent
care when it comes to everything
other than immunization. We will
later address the worry that accepting
vaccine refusers into one’s practice
undermines clinicians’ ability to care
for other patients. We begin with
a critique of some motivations for
nonacceptance.
MOTIVATIONS FOR NONACCEPTANCE
Several potential motivations for not
accepting vaccine refusers are
intrinsically wrong. For instance, it is
wrong for clinicians not to accept
vaccine refusers because they want
only compliant families. This
motivation is excessively paternalistic
and inconsistent with patient- and
family-centered care, which requires
a willingness to collaborate and
compromise to find treatments that
are consistent with family values and
preferences.9 This motivation is also
inconsistent with the values of
openness and tolerance that should
be promoted in the context of caring
for members of diverse communities.
Pediatric clinicians frequently allow
families in their practices who do not
fully comply with recommendations.
For example, the fact that parents
smoke in the home or provide
unhealthy foods for their children is
not commonly thought to be a reason
to exclude them from pediatric
practices.
In contrast to this inherently
unjustifiable motivation, many
motivations for nonacceptance may
be permissible in themselves but fail
to achieve the goals at which they
aim. For instance, clinicians
sometimes choose not to accept
vaccine refusers to incentivize
vaccination or to protect professional
integrity. In the next section, we argue
that not accepting vaccine refusers
for these reasons is also not
justifiable.
Incentivizing Vaccination
Some argue that the threat of
dismissal can be leveraged to
promote vaccine uptake.10,11 Such
threats are likely to be unethically
coercive, particularly in communities
with few pediatricians. But even if
such threats were not coercive, the
appropriateness of these threats
hinges on whether there is good
evidence that they promote vaccine
uptake. Anecdotes aside, there is no
empirical evidence that they do.4
Furthermore, even if dismissal
improved vaccine uptake, it seems
less likely that nonacceptance would
have the same effect because
dismissal presents families with the
prospect of losing an existing
relationship, something that families
who are only potential patients do
not yet possess. Policies of
nonacceptance seem to offer less
leverage to incentivize vaccination
than dismissal policies because
a parent whose child has an existing
relationship with a pediatric provider
has more to lose than one who
does not.
Defending Professional Integrity
Some clinicians assert that the
dismissal of vaccine refusers is
necessary to preserve professional
integrity. Retaining vaccine refusers
in one’s practice, the argument goes,
is tantamount to the approval of
providing substandard care.12
We agree that clinicians should
uncompromisingly advocate for
the highest standards of care.
Accordingly, appeals to professional
integrity make at least some sense in
the context of dismissal because
dismissing clinicians have
presumably made good-faith
attempts to persuade and educate
vaccine refusers. They have
advocated for the standard of care
and thereby upheld their professional
integrity. In contrast, clinicians who
choose not to accept vaccine-refusing
families have not attempted to
persuade those families to vaccinate
and thus have not advocated for the
standard of care within the context of
those families. Therefore,
a commitment to professional
integrity cannot count in favor of
nonacceptance.
Along similar lines, one might defend
dismissal or nonacceptance as a form
of conscientious objection, a claim
that deserves special attention in light
of recent efforts to expand conscience
protections in medicine.13 Central to
this argument is that clinicians not
only have a duty of nonmaleficence,
which prohibits offering treatments
they believe are harmful, but they
also have a right to refuse to provide
interventions they believe are
ethically wrong. Yet including
vaccine-refusing families in one’s
practice does not involve offering
treatments that are harmful or
providing interventions that one
believes are ethically wrong. Rather, it
involves honoring a parent’s refusal
of a beneficial intervention, at least
for a period of time. Therefore, we
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argue that the concept of
conscientious objection supports
neither dismissal nor nonacceptance
of vaccine-refusing families.
TRUST AND NONACCEPTANCE
Some clinicians may dismiss vaccine
refusers because they believe parents
and clinicians cannot trust each other
about other issues in pediatric care
once they reach an impasse about
vaccines.10,12 This conclusion is
supported by the AAP.1,7 We argue,
however, that although worries about
a breakdown in trust may sometimes
justify dismissal, they do not justify
nonacceptance. There is no evidence
that all vaccine-refusing families
systematically distrust pediatric
clinicians. This means that clinicians
often do not know in advance, on the
basis of vaccine refusal alone, that
a family will not trust them.
Furthermore, there is concern that
dismissal may actually undermine the
trust families place in a particular
clinician or in the medical
profession,7,14 a concern that would




We have so far contended that several
motivations for not accepting vaccine
refusers are either intrinsically wrong
or cannot accomplish their goals.
There are, however, some laudable
goals that nonacceptance could
possibly promote, including reducing
the risks to other patients and the
burden on clinicians. We argue,
however, that nonacceptance is not
justifiable, even if it accomplishes
these goals, because it unacceptably
undermines other central competing
goals, including the health of the
child, public health, and solidarity
with one’s colleagues.
Dismissal is occasionally defended on
the grounds that allowing families to
remain in one’s practice after
continued refusal of vaccines imposes
unacceptably high risks of infection
on other patients and excessive legal
liabilities, financial risks, and
psychological burden on clinicians.12
The evidence for these claims
remains inconclusive.3,7 However,
even if there were sufficient evidence,
we must also ask whether
nonacceptance appropriately
balances the interests of other
patients and the clinician against
other ethical goals that clinicians
must promote. There are at least 3
reasons to think that nonacceptance
does not achieve this balance.
First, a precautionary principle, in
which clinicians should never admit
patients who could increase risks to
themselves or other patients, could
justify nonacceptance, but this
principle provides an unreasonable
standard for deciding when to accept
families. Many kinds of patients can
be risky (eg, patients with active
infections or recent histories of
exposure), and it would be
unreasonable for a practice to refuse
to accept all such patients. Therefore,
we maintain that a precautionary
principle is not an appropriate way to
balance the values involved in
decisions about whether to accept
vaccine refusers.
Second, a commitment to exclude
children whose parents make bad
choices could support nonacceptance,
but this principle is likewise
unjustifiable. Many child patients
have parents who make bad
decisions, such as children with
obesity whose parents are
noncompliant with clinical guidance
about nutrition. It is taken for granted
within the profession that these
children should not be denied care,
even if they are more burdensome
and even if their parents continue to
refuse to change their minds.
Therefore, a principle of excluding
patients who are riskier or more
burdensome because their parents
make bad choices does not well
balance the values involved in
decisions about whether to accept
vaccine refusers.
Third, nonacceptance is inconsistent
with a duty to attempt to change
vaccine-refusing families’ minds.
Vaccine refusal is a modifiable
behavior15 with several evidence-
based strategies available for
increasing vaccine acceptance within
the doctor-parent relationship.16
Clinicians cannot know ahead of time
which families might respond to their
efforts to promote, educate, and
persuade.17 The importance of the
child patient’s health, the public’s
health, and solidarity to other
pediatric professionals all support
making such efforts.
Education and persuasion efforts may
promote an unvaccinated child’s well-
being, both because they may change
parents’ minds about vaccines but
also because the child patient will
continue to receive preventive care.
Moreover, efforts to educate and
persuade may be good for the public’s
health, both because children may
eventually get some vaccines but also
because keeping undervaccinated
children in one’s practice prevents
many more of them from clustering in
only a few practices, which
contributes to outbreaks.18,19 Finally,
efforts to educate and persuade are
a means by which clinicians can bear
their share of the burdens associated
with caring for vaccine-refusing
families.7,20 In contrast, a clinician
who dismisses or does not accept
vaccine-refusing families violates
professional solidarity by transferring
the burdens associated with that
family to colleagues.
Ultimately, although all of these
concerns about children’s well-being,
public health, and solidarity with
colleagues count against dismissal,
they weigh even more heavily against
nonacceptance. A clinician who
dismisses patients after months or
years of continued vaccine refusal has
absorbed a share of the burdens
associated with treating these
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families, and they have made at least
some effort to promote the health of
the child and to protect the health of
the community. In contrast, clinicians
who do not even accept vaccine
refusers defer these burdens entirely
to others and do not fulfill their
responsibility to children and the
broader community.
CONCLUSIONS
On first glance, the dismissal and
nonacceptance of vaccine refusers
may seem to be morally equivalent
practices. In turn, some may conclude
that the AAP’s recent permission to
dismiss vaccine refusers grants tacit
permission not to accept such
families. But dismissal and
nonacceptance are not ethically
equivalent practices. Even if dismissal
were sometimes an ethically
acceptable option, wholesale
nonacceptance of these families
is not.
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